







SOME THOUGHTS ON DEVELOPING A
THEORY OF COMBAT
by
R. K. Huber, L. J. Low and J. G. Taylor
July 1979







Rear Admiral T. F. Dedman Jack R. Borsting
Superintendent Provost
This research was supported partially by the Foundation Research Program
of the Naval Postgraduate School with funds provided by the Chief of
Naval Research, and partially by the Scientific Affairs Division of NATO
Research Grants Programme.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
Prepared by:
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER
NPS55-79-014
2 GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4 TITLE (and Subtitle)
Some Thoughts on Developing a Theory of Combat
5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Technical
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s)
R. K. Huber, L. J. Low and J. G. Taylor
8 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfs)
9. PERFORMING ORGANI ZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Ca 9 3940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
54




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abstract entered In Block 20, it different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES







20 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide If necessary and Identity by block number)
Following a brief discussion on the need for and the contents of a theory
of combat, a conceptual approach to approximate such a theory is proposed




1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S N 10 2-014- 660
1
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Knfr:l>






Fed. Armed Forces University
Munich, West Germany














A. Towards a Theory of Combat, R. K. Huber, L. J. Low,
and J. G. Taylor 3
B. Identification of the Major Factors in Combat,
L . J . Low 11
C. Approximating a Theory of Combat, R. K. Huber 21
D. A Review of Some Previous Attempts to Establish
a Theory of Combat, J. G. Taylor 28

Introduction
This report documents the authors 1 contributions to the
design and conduct of the "Theory of Combat" workshop sponsored
jointly by the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Naval Postgraduate
School and held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 10-11 July 1979.
The purpose of the workshop was to
(1) define what a theory of combat entails;
(2) whether and why such a theory is needed;
(3) whether the development of a theory of combat is
feasible
;
(4) how one might proceed in developing a theory of combat
While the results of the conference will be published in
detail by the Defense Nuclear Agency, it is the perception of the
authors of this report that the workshop rather unanimously agreed
that a theory of combat is needed and its development is feasible.
The majority of the workshop participants felt that the
need to improve the theoretical basis of defense planning support
(e.g. related to operations planning, weapon system design and
selection, force structure planning, force sizing, operational
concepts and tactics, defense concepts) appeared to be the
principal reason why a theory of combat should be developed.
Additionally, they felt that the desire to better explain and
understand the phenomenon of combat was an important secondary
justification. The question as to what a theory of combat is to
cover beyond the phenomenon associated with the mutual infliction
of casualties in battle needs to be further debated. With respect
to defense planning issues it appears necessary to extend the
scope of the theory to perhaps also cover some politico-military
paraphernalia of combat, but to limit it as to exclude the (mere)
exchange of strikes in a militarily static environment (e.g.
strategic nuclear exchanges) . There appeared to be two development
approaches forwarded at the workshop, a "descriptive" historical
approach and a "normative" systems analysis approach. While the
historical approach aims at deriving combat laws directly from a
study of combat histories, the systems analysis approach is based
on combat simulations providing "histories" for the various combat
process hypotheses in historical settings.
The research underlying papers presented at the appendices
has been supported in part by the Office of Naval Research through
the Foundation Research Program (Taylor) and in part by the
Scientific Affairs Division of NATO through the NATO Research
Grants Programme (Huber) . The authors also wish to express their
appreciation and thanks to Lt . Col. Richard S. Miller, USA, and
to Professor Michael G. Sovereign for their valuable contributions
and discussions throughout the genesis of the papers.
APPENDIX A: TOWARDS A THEORY OF COMBAT
by
R. K. Huber, L. J. Low, J. G. Taylor
The Need for a Theory of Combat
A rather persistent observation that surfaces periodically
from the analysis community involved with the development and use
of combat models is that of the need for a theory of combat ([1]-
[3]). Today, modeling efforts are usually centered around speci-
fic problems and pending program appropriations related to weapon
system and force structure planning. The proliferation of model
developments on land/air combat is ample proof, not only to an
almost exclusively decision-oriented approach to combat modeling
(see Huber [2]) , but also to the fact that each model tends to
reflect the particular analysts' and/or users' perceptions on
combat elements and processes. Thus, models appear to be based
primarily on (frequently even diverging) hypotheses rather than
on empirically tested theories. In a recent (September 1977)
workshop for thsater-level gaming and analysis [4], the issue of
a requirement for a "theory of combat," or "laws of war," or for
"insights into the phenomena of war," was expressed many times.
It is believed that an intellectual, scientific endeavor
of this type, albeit extraordinarily difficult, is sorely needed
to link the model abstractions of combat to what happens, in
reality, on the battlefield. The need for a viable theory of
combat becomes increasingly manifest as the changes in the strate-
gic balance, the emergence of new weapons and information technol-
ogies and, last but not least, the alarming increase in systems
cost will eventually require a series of vital decisions on
defense concepts, force structures, and weapon developments that
may tax our present methods of analysis beyond all credibility.
Thus, we must strive for some capability to "benchmark" our
analytical techniques against reality.
It is for these reasons that the following preliminary
thoughts are presented as a frame of reference • for subsequent
discussion during the workshop in July. From these discussions,
hopefully, will emerge a viable research approach to a theory of
combat.
Definition of a Theory of Combat
A theory of combat may be defined as the embodiment of a
set of laws governing military combat. In particular, it would
(1) discern patterns in the interactions and relationships
among the major elements of combat that operate through
2)
a set of distinct combat processes;
(2) identify particular patterns of interactions and relation-
ships which consistently shape or determine the outcome
of combat (defined in some manner)
;
(3) express the patterns so identified in quantitative terms,
i.e., as functional relationships between sets of inde-
pendent and dependent variables.
combat circumstances, operating environment, human combatants
(characteristics and behavior) , hardware and software implements
of warfare.
2)
attrition, movement, command, control, communications and
intelligence (C 3 I) , combat support.
Elements of a Theory of Combat
Any scientific theory of a dynamic system must involve
the following elements:
(a) independent variables (inputs)
,
(b) dependent variables (outputs,
(c) system processes (relating inputs to outputs
over time)
.
Applying such a conceptual framework to military combat at the
tactical level, we envision the elements of a theory of combat
as consisting of the following:
(1) independent variables of combat (inputs to combat)
,
(2) dependent variables of combat (mission-oriented outputs)
,
(3) combat processes (relating combat inputs to outputs over
time)
.
These three basic elements of a theory of combat will now be
elaborated upon in the next three sections.
Furthermore, the set of input variables is very large
(combat is a very complex process), and, therefore, another
important element of a theory of combat is the classification
and organization of the set of input variables into more manage-
able subsets (cf., the work of COL T. N. Dupuy (USA, ret.) of
HERO [5]). Moreover, the system modeler needs to know which of
the input variables are the significant variables in the sense
that inputs can be "adequately" related to outputs. Finally,
although the above basic set of elements is of general applica-
bility, its realization in specific instances is unquestionably
quite variable and a systematic examination is required.
Dependent Variables (Outputs)
Ultimately, a viable theory of combat is to provide
defense analysts and planners a better perspective on the con-
tribution of alternative force designs and operational concepts
in order to attain the military objectives set forth by the
national objectives. Thereby, we consider the military objec-
tives to define the (ultimate) military mission in the context
of a theater (e.g., for NATO, the mission to preserve her terri-
torial integrity). Thus, the theory of combat relates the
independent variables or inputs to the (degree or probability of)
mission accomplishment, through a hierarchy of objectives and
dependent variables as measures of their attainment at each level
of combat (engagement -* encounter -* battle -» campaign > war) .
At each level, the upper level sets the objectives and the scen-
arios, the lower level provides the inputs (Bode [5], Huber [2]).
Independent Variables (Inputs)
The independent variables upon which the outcome of combat
depends may be grouped into essentially six categories:
(1) mission;
(2) human combatant characteristics and behavior;
(3) material resources such as weapons, vehicles, supplies, etc.;
(4) organization and structure;
(5) doctrine and operational concepts;
(6) the physical environment (e.g., weather, terrain, urban-
ization, transportation network, etc.) prevailing in the
potential theater (s) of operation.
'In due course of the development of a theory, the
variables in each of these categories have to be identified and
their relevance (to the outputs) must be established at each
combat level. In addition, methods of their measurement have to
be developed.
Combat Processes
The process of military combat takes the inputs to combat
and converts them into outputs. However, this overall combat
process is extremely complicated, and consequently it seems
appropriate to factor this overall process into simpler, more
manageable subprocesses. Traditional military thinking of the
U.S. Army provides the basis for one such possible factorization
of the overall combat process: in the U.S. Army's own words [7],
the fundamental role of ground-combat troops is to "shoot, move,
and communicate." Hence, one has at least an intuitively appeal-





(3) C I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) ,
(4) support.
We have added the support (logistics) process to the list of
processes corresponding to shooting, moving, and communicating,
since it functions (essentially independent of the other combat




Approaches to Developing a Theory of Combat
The basic scientific approach for developing a theory of
combat is to use "empirical data" obtained in a systematic
fashion through "controlled experiments" to establish the func-
tional relationship between the independent variables (inputs)
and the dependent variables (outputs) of combat.
There are essentially three principal approaches to
develop functional relationships between the inputs and outputs
of military systems:
(1) the historical approach through the study of records of
3)historical combat;
(2) the judgmental approach based on field experience in
combat and/or military exercises;
(3) the operational analysis approach through the use of
4)physical and/or formal models.
3)
4)
Although there are many difficulties associated with this approach,
it has never been systematically pursued in the past (at least
to definitively establish the bounds on its realm of applicability)
,
and, therefore, a well-thought out historical research program
should be an essential part of any future effort to develop a
theory of combat.
Depending on the models used, the operational analysis approach
may be further subdivided. It encompasses the entire range from
(controlled) field experiments to highly abstract analytical
models (see Low [4], Taylor, [8,9], Huber and Wobith [10]). They
serve to pursue a program of controlled "simulated-combat" experi -
ments (within the constraints of player-personnel safety) in order
to generate quasi-combat data for developing the functional rela-
tionship between inputs and outputs. Thereby, one can view not
only military organizations as being hierarchical (e.g., company,
battalion, brigade, division, corps, army) but also military combat
itself (e.g., engagement, battle, campaign, war). The consideration
of hierarchical combat models is necessitated by the great inherent
complexity of combat. Thus, the classification and organization of
variables, data sources, combat situations, etc., appears to be an
integral part of the development of a theory of combat.
With respect to the development of a theory of combat,
these approaches must be considered as complementary rather than
competing. It is necessary to integrate them such, that through
their interaction, hypotheses related to military combat may be
tested as a prerequisite to the development of a viable theory.
To this end, strategies for the development of such integrated
approaches shall be identified and assessed to establish priori-
ties for further research and development support.
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APPENDIX B:
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAJOR FACTORS IN COMBAT
by
L. J. Low
In this paper, we will explore in greater detail those factors
identified in our definition of a theory of combat. As a result of this
exploration we hope we can better understand certain fundamental relation-
ships among these factors. We will attempt to fashion in a heuristic
manner a picture of the final outcome, formed by interaction of the pre-
viously identified elements and processes of combat.
To review, and perhaps expand a bit, the elements of combat are:
(1) Combat circumstances; initial objectives and missions (both
sides)
(2) Natural and man-made environments in the area of operations
(3) Human resources, numbers and characteristics
(4) Material Resources, numbers and characteristics
(5) Organization and structure of opposing forces
(6) Tactics, doctrine and operational concepts.




(3) Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C I)
(A) Combat support
(5) Combat service support.
In the traditional mathematical modeling of combat, one essentially
puts the combat elements (as inputs) into mathematical formulations of
the combat processes, tied together by appropriate logic. The resultant
outputs are, in effect, the outcomes of the encounter between opposing
All of the equipment and devices for the waging and the support of war
11
forces. In this context, and as noted earlier, the combat elements are
essentially the independent variables in the procedure (although not
necessarily independent of each other) and the outputs or outcomes are
the dependent variables. Furthermore, there are some gymnastics involved
in reducing some of the rather broad considerations listed as combat ele-
ments to input variables that can be treated as "measurables . " The con-
nection is often more implicit than explicit. In a similar fashion, the
quantitative or measurable outputs resulting from these mathematical
operations may be expanded implicitly into broader interpretations of
engagement outcome.
Perhaps the simplest graphical portrayal of combat is from Low [l]
Page xv and shown in Figure 1. The accompanying quotation from [l] is:
11 Simply stated, all combat involves the interaction between
opposing forces, designated RED and BLUE. These forces are composed
of men and equipment , are governed by operating procedures and in-
volve some measure of combat support . Both forces function in an
operational environment
,
which is composed of natural factors such
as weather and terrain. The interaction between RED and BLUE re-
sults in a combat operations outcome
,
which can be measured in a
variety of ways ."
Sykes [2] gives additional substance to the "bare bones" concept
of Figure 1 in the following excerpt.
" The interaction between RED and BLUE both affects, and
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COMBAT OPERATIONS OUTCOME
FIGURE 1 A CONCEPT OF COMBAT
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• Equipment repair
• Construction (roads, bridges, etc.)
Attrition
• Weapon/Target characteristics (air-to-aur, air-to-
ground, ground-to-ground
• Munition characteristics (e.g., precision-guided or
free-flight, fragmenting or solid shot)
• Engagement characteristics (visibility, movement,
range, terrain, etc.)
and results in a combat operations outcome which can be measured
in a variety of ways:









• Equipment cost "
This quote, in keeping with the tutorial nature of the material in
Sykes [2], reflects a breakdown similar to the analyst's traditional
division of combat into elements, processes and outcomes. This breakdown
reflects more, perhaps, the way things are rather than the way they should
be.
In comparing the information in Figure 1 with our earlier lists of
combat elements and processes, we find both are in reasonable consonance,
recognizing, of course that the figure encompasses the three categories
of elements, processes and outcomes. By broadly interpreting some of
the factors in Figure 1, for example, "Operating Procedures" to include
(5) and (6) under the elements of combat and (3) under combat processes,
and "Combat Support" to include both (4) and (5) under combat processes,
we find the acceptable agreement between the figure and the listings. It
should further be noted that the parallel left-to-right and right- to- left
arrows between RED and BLUE in Figure 1 represent attrition and movement
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interactions (processes) between forces and that a larger block, surround-
ing the figure could well represent (1) under combat elements.
Figure 2 intends to expand upon and to structure further the concept
advanced in Figure 1 as well as to represent more explicitly the relation-
ships among elements, processes, and outcomes. The type of warfare se-
lected for purposes of illustration is ground warfare, involving combined
arms operations, since this is generally conceded the most complex of all
the forms of warfare that employ general purpose forces.
Figure 2 treats the phenomenon of combat so that it reflects the
viewpoint of a systems analyst. The structure of the combat process in
its entirety, as presented, is completely based on empiricism; that is,
our observations of and experience with armed conflict as it has occurred
countless times since the dawn of recorded history. While the figure
does explicitly identify "modern" concepts like command and control and
combat intelligence, these processes have existed at least vestigially,
perhaps, throughout the entire history of warfare. It is only recently
that some of them have been singled out as deserving special designation
and recognition. It is of utmost importance, however, that the phenomenolo-
gical "model" of Figure 2 not be limited in applicability and utility,
because the viewer happens to be a social scientist, a mathematician, or
a physicist/engineer. In spelling out how combat, as a set of fairly
distinct entities, unfolds and how these entities interact with one
another, the model should constitute a valid structural representation
of what has happened repeatedly on the battlefields of the "real world"
(and what is likely to happen in the future) quite irrespective of the
disciplinary backgrounds of the viewers of the model.
Referring to Figure 2, we might start with the block labeled "Combat
Forces" in which there appears a breakdown of land combat forces into a
series of man/machine systems. Each of these systems (in the hands of a
"typical" operator) has inherent performance characteristics and capa-
bilities that are measurable in an engineering, laboratory, or proving
ground sense. These characteristics are related to, but are not of them-
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difference between characteristics and MOE's is that in the definition
of the former there is little or no dependency on the system mission and
the threat which might confront the system; whereas in the definition of
the dependency on mission and threat is fundamental. Examples of char-
acteristics might be the steady rate-of-fire of an automatic weapon in
an "auto-fire" mode or the rate-of-climb , maximum speed, or minimum
turning radius of a fighter aircraft. While these characteristics pro-
vide some indication in a peripheral way of how well the system might
perform in combat against an enemy, they do not directly provide an answer
to that particular question.
As shown in Figure 2, the combat forces are influenced by a set of
human factors and behavioral variables which are a very important, yet
an oft-neglected (by analysts), part of the man/machine complex. These
forces are supported by a logistics and supply system that provides them
with manpower, food, fuel, ammunition, replacement equipment, construc-
tion, repair facilities, and spares. The force configuration is dictated
by battle objectives ("Command Objectives" in Figure 2) and, based on
these objectives, the capabilities of the men and equipment within the
force are "controlled" and molded so they yield an appropriate vector of
total combat power that can be directed against the enemy. This command/
control function should recognize and attempt to capitalize on the syner-
gistic effects of several or all of the ground warfare systems operating
in a mutually supportive role against an enemy. Thus, in effect, will
the employment tactics for the man/machine systems within the force be
defined
.
The concept of a measure of effectiveness for each and every system
in the friendly force emerges from the combined interaction of these
systems with the enemy forces in the battlefield environment. These
measures are related to and in fact in certain instances are synonymous
with combat outcomes at the systems level. Interaction alluded to
generally take the form of attrition and movement or both. The individ-
ual effectiveness contributions for all systems theoretically combine
in some manner to produce an overall measure of effectiveness for the
friendly force(s). This measure encompasses the effects of weapon system
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combat performance in relation to those of specific enemy units in a
specific geographical and climatological environment, the behavioral
characteristics of the human beings involved in the conflict, the dif-
ferences in command objectives and in the nature and degree of control
for both sides, and the ability of the logistics support system (which
may well be subject to enemy attrition) to meet force demands. The
force effectiveness is, in effect, an operator on the states of both
enemy and friendly forces, influencing whatever changes in state that
may occur ("A Force State" in Figure 2). From these changes in state
one can determine whether the friendly force advances, retreats, or is
in a stand-off condition with respect to the enemy force.
To complete this cursory description of a very complex process,
Figure 2 contains an "Intelligence" block (incorporating the combat sup-
port processes of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance) which is
where potentially serious "noise" can be introduced into the system.
This "noise" reflects the degree of difference between the perceptions
and the realities of combat activities, outcomes and related factors.
This difference almost always exists because of certain imperfections
and delays in the gathering of information and the passing of it, and
the execution of commands under battle conditions. The perceptions of
what is occurring are fed back to the command structure and perhaps change
the objectives and hence the level, composition, or employment (control)
of forces ("strategic" feed-back). On the other hand, at a more local
level on the battlefield, and with characteristically shorter time delays,
these perceptions can influence changes in tactics (control) with the
intent to alter the course of battle in a way favorable to the friendly
forces ("tactical" feed-back). In association with the feedback loops
and control block of Figure 2 there is implied an appropriate netting
of communications.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that there exists an analyti-
cal flow diagram for the enemy forces that is identical to the one shown
in Figure 2 for the friendly forces along the lines of Figure 1. This
would branch out from the block labeled "Enemy Counter-Force Activity" in
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much the same way that Figure 2 is oriented about the friendly "forces"
block, but has been omitted for reasons of clarity. The entire process
is a dynamic one and the existence of two such dynamic, symmetrical flow
paths of information and activity for friend and foe portrays rather
graphically the complex, two-sided nature of armed conflict.
The foregoing is an attempt to reconcile the analytical with the
historical/judgmental points of view in studying the phenomenon of combat.
We are addressing what is, in essence, a socio- technological system,
where, traditionally, the analytical emphasis has been placed almost en-
tirely on the "technological" (because it is relatively easy to deal
with) and not on the "socio" (because it is relatively difficult). Even
though Figure 2 localizes manpower characteristics within the "Combat
Forces" block, it is easy to appreciate the strong influence these
characteristics exert on the command and control and combat support proc-
esses. Ironically, there is strong evidence in the work of T. N. Du Puy
[3] suggesting that in this system, the social/behavioral aspects of the
problem may be just as, or more important than the technological aspects.
One must always bear in mind, however, the fact that the two are strongly
interrelated.
While Figure 2 attempts to identify all of the major factors and
their interactions that influence the outcome in combat, we do not know
which of these, under what particular set of conditions, act as drivers.
Were this known, perhaps a vast simplification of the dynamic, looping
structure described in this paper could be achieved. Be that as it may,
it is the identification of the driving elements and processes that are
fundamental to the development of a theory of combat.
19
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APPENDIX C:




A theory may be defined as a system of scientific laws
which conceptually reconstruct objective patterns on a subject
(see Bunge [1], p. 27).
The process through which scientific laws are won is
referred to as the Scientific Method . Figure 1 attempts a
schematic reconstruction of that process. It initiates from a
problem pertaining to questions not answered by the body of
available knowledge on a subject. To answer these questions
hypotheses are derived and their implications, i.e. testable
consequences, are deduced. In order to verify the hypotheses,
their implications are compared to empirical evidence obtained
from experiments or tests. If there is agreement, i.e. the same
conclusions are reached by both, the hypotheses and the empiri-
cal evidence, then we have a confirmed hypothesis or a scientific
law. It follows that the verification of the deductively derived
hypotheses with empirical observations of combat is prerequisite
to eventually arriving at a viable Theory of Combat.
*This research was supported by the Scientific Affairs Division




















2 . The Verification Dilemma
Thus, the only rigorous technique to test the truth of
combat hypotheses is to observe and measure events in actual
combat . Needless to say, the organization of such experiments
is quite difficult and, in most instances, impossible. There
only remains to extract the empirical evidence from records of
historical battles. However, a viable statistical analysis of
historical battle data is not readily accomplished, since histori-
cal records are rarely adequate in this respect (see R. 0. Goad
[4] and Schafer [5]). Besides, the nature of most historical
information is such that it may only confirm rather aggregated
combat hypotheses (see Taylor [6]). Also, agreement as to the
deductions from the hypotheses and the historical evidence con-
firms the respective hypotheses only insofar as they represent
true models of combat under conditions as they prevailed at the
respective historical period. Their relevance to future combat
is by no means confirmed. With combat being a social rather than
a physical phenomenon, the environmental dynamics prohibit a
rigorous verification as in the physical sciences.
Thus, while the explanatory qualities of combat hypotheses
and models may be verified, at least in principle, their predictive
qualities may not. This poses a dilemma since the model deductions
which are of interest to the military planner and commander refer
World War II operations research was indeed characterized by
drawing inferences regarding future military operations from
the data gathered during the ongoing military operations (see
e.g. Waddington [2], and Morse and Kimball [3]).
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to things that are likely to happen in the future if particular
courses of action or policies were pursued. The only way to
alleviate this dilemma somewhat is to create an " ersatz " history
by anticipating future combat through simulation experiments. Of
course, such experiments are tests in a very limited sense because
2)
simulations are based on models , their results ultimately being
but logical deductions from the employed models. But one might
approach verification if simulation results cannot be falsified
in historical settings.
3. The Concept of Falsification to Approximate a Theory of Combat
In our context, falsification is considered to prove that
the simulation results could not have occurred in the historical
setting of the simulation, or rather, that the historical battle
could not have developed as the simulated battle did. Thus, a
negative falsification does not require that the simulations
3)
reproduce the historical battle . Positive falsification
2) With respect to combat simulation we distinguish three basic
classes of models: (1) physical, (2) formal, and (3) hybrid
models. Two-sided combat simulations employ either formal
models (e.g. in simulation games; see Huber [7]) or a combina-
tion of physical and formal models, i.e. hybrid models (e.g.
in interactive war games, field experiments, and military
exercises; see [7] and [8]).
3) It is apparently little understood that a (highly unlikely) repro-
duction of a historical battle event sequence by a simulation
is no proof as to the "truth" of the underlying models. Due to
the random nature of many events influencing combat, the course
of a historical battle is rather unique and hardly reproducible
if the same battle could be fought over again. Just as one run
of a simulation model is of little value with respect to a pre-
diction of battle outcome conditions, so is the historical battle
Therefore, the attempt to derive, from historical data, determi-
nistic battle outcome prediction models or to calibrate or tune
deterministic models such that they reproduce history appears to
be of little value.
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needs to prove that the course of the historical battle is not
an element of the set of possible outcomes within the signifi-
cance bounds of the simulation.
Thus, the concept of falsification implies that a deduc-
tively derived combat hypothesis may be considered viable as
long as historical research does not provide statistically
significant evidence for its rejection. While such negative
falsifications are still short of a rigorous verification in the
sense of the physical sciences, their repeated occurrence through-
out a series of "historical tests" may nevertheless be considered
as to approach verification of the respective hypotheses and thus
resemble a reasonable approximation to "laws of combat" and
eventually a theory of combat. From this we conclude that as a
prerequisite to a viable theory of combat (being a set of "quasi-
verified" hypotheses on military combat) we need to
(1) redefine the role of historical analyses and the
historians 1 mode of operation so that statistically
useful data are extracted from historical records
permitting statistically significant falsification
attempts (see e.g. McQuie [9]);
(2) design and operationalize a consistent and compre-
hensive methodological approach to combat simulation
that allows us to systematically develop quasi-




(3) organize a historical research program which extracts
data (a) on the scenarios of historical battles as
inputs to subsequent simulations of these battles and
(b) on the testable consequences or hypothetical impli-
cations forwarded by combat simulations;
(4) develop the statistical and judgmental techniques which
facilitate the historians' interpretation of simulation
results in the light of the historical data with a view
to the falsification of the simulations.
Whether such an effort is feasible and whether the under-
lying approach is viable needs further debate. However, its
realization would support and extend Bonder's recommendations [10]
insofar as it (a) requires extensive parametric analyses; (b)
involves an intimate cooperation between military experts, historians,
and systems analysts; (c) applies systems analysis as a research
and learning vehicle rather than an instrument for advocacy
(see [7,10]); (d) would contribute to the long range evolution of
"standard models" by eventually providing an acceptable theoretical
basis; (e) would help to reinstate the application of the principles
of the scientific method in the field of military affairs thus
contributing to the evolution of a true unified "military science"
to replace today's misconceptions about military systems analysis
set apart as a "scientific" tool to supnort (and frequently antago-
nize) an "artistic" military judgment.
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APPENDIX D
A REVIEW OF SOME PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS





This paper is a companion paper to one on the conceptual
bases for the establishment of a scientific theory of combat (see
Huber [1]). It briefly reviews previous efforts at establishing a
theory of combat. This is a working paper designed to stimulate
discussion and further interchange among interested parties. The
author would appreciate any and all communications on conceptual
flaws, significant omissions, further references, etc.
2.0. Some Early Thoughts on Developing a Theory of Combat
The only attempt (known to this author) that has appeared
(and at a very early date) to discuss an "adequate theory of combat"
is H. K. Weiss' s pioneering piece of work "Requirements for a Theory
of Combat" [2]. Although our thinking has evolved quite a bit since
this report's appearance in 1953, it is still worthwhile reading
today (especially concerning command and control and behavioral
This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research through
the Foundation Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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aspects). Weiss' s report is significant because it was a careful,
reflective piece of work which first stressed the importance of
empirical investigations on combat models and anticipated model-
verification efforts carried out later by Weiss, Helmbold, and
others (see Appendix for corresponding references)
.
Weiss' s paper contains the germs of many ideas that have
assumed great significance today. He stressed the importance of
the verification of combat models against historical data ("actual
combat records") and the use of simulated combat data (i.e. those that
come from laboratory tests and field experiments) as model inputs.
Weiss noted [2, p. 25] that data on the performance of system ele-
ments was "becoming available at a rapid rate." Weiss also pre-
sented a classification scheme for (independent) variables [i.e.
those relating to (1) weapons, (2) users, (3) terrain, (4) targets,
and (5) the enemy] (cf. Hayward [3] and also COL T. N. Dupuy (USA,
ret.) of HERO [4]) and stressed the importance of behavioral aspects
(e.g. "freshness" of forces) . This report is also notable for its
suggested enrichments in Lanchester's original work [5], some ini-
tial thoughts on a theory of morale, and discussion of the require-
ments for a theory of communications, which Weiss envisioned as a
key element in any theory of combat.
3.0. Development of the Laws of Combat
In this section we will briefly review the conceptual basis
for developing a scientific theory of combat, before we discuss
what attempts have been made to establish such a historically-based
theory. The latter evaluative step entails discussion of the sources,
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nature, and availability of combat data and the modelling of com-
bat operations.
3.1. Conceptual Basis
Here we take a theory of combat to mean an organization of
the laws of combat. A law , in turn, is a confirmed hypothesis,
i.e. a hypothesis that has been "confirmed" (or, more precisely,
the truth of which has not been contradicted) by the available
empirical evidence (see Huber [1] for a more complete discussion).
Within the context of military operations research (OR) , such a
hypothesis to be confirmed may be considered to be quantitatively
expressed as a model. Thus, a major step towards a theory of com-
bat is the development of scientific laws for military combat.
Such laws would then be the basis for developing models of com-
bat processes for defense-planning purposes.
Combat models are widely used by DoD as decision aids in
defense planning (see Taylor [8, pp. 774-776] for further details).
Does such a model (necessarily an abstraction) agree (or, at least,
not disagree) with the realities of the physical world (either now
or in a possible future)? Thus, the combat scientist is faced with
the very practical problem of verifying the combat model, perhaps
Today such combat models and simulations are by and large based
on unconfirmed hypotheses . In fact, documentation (at least in
the recent past) of models used by DoD has been so bad (e.g. see
Shubik and Brewer [6]) that many important models either are not
documented or (if they have been documented) their conceptual
bases are not explained (although detailed program listings may
be provided)
. What is needed is an organized and nontechnical
explanation of a combat model's conceptual bases, with technical
back-up being provided in a selective (and possibly hierarchical)
fashion (e.g. see Shupack [7]).
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with respect to future possible circumstances and not the reali-
ties of today. In general, the problem of verifying models of
man/machine systems is quite difficult (e.g. see Naylor and Finger
[9] or Van Horn [10], and combat models present a number of special
subtleties (see also Huber [1]), although the process of model
verification frequently appears to the uninitiated to be straight-
forward. We will now discuss a few of these subtle points, but
much more careful reflective discussion is needed on this difficult
subject.
Special subtleties present in the scientific verification
of combat models are as follows:
(1) principle of uniformitarianism does not hold,
(2) systems are only partially observable,
(3) conceptual basis of knowledge is more like that in the
social sciences than that in the physical sciences.
The physical sciences are essentially based on the principle of
uniformitarianism
, which holds that physical and biological pro-
cesses, conditions, and operations do not change over time (i.e.
uniformity over time). For example, in geology the doctrine of
uniformitarianism holds that the present is the key to the past
[11]. This principle, of course, does not hold for planning models
of new future environments (e.g. see Howland [12]). Thus, the
combat modeller faces a special problem (which has gone largely
unnoticed) in verifying his models: the empirical data base for
the testing of such a model is from the real world (past) , whereas
31
the prediction from the model is for the real world (future)
.
What is meant by the verification of such a planning model is in
need of critical examination. Additionally, in contrast to the
modelling of purely physical systems, combat models involve (1)
hardware (e.g. weapons) and physical processes, (2) people, and
(3) or organizational structures. Although human behavior in
combat may not change appreciably over time, weapons (i.e. hard-
ware) and organizational structures have and will continue to
change appreciably. Thus, the principle of uniformitarianism
does not hold for combat analysis, and we cannot use the past by
itself to predict the future for combat operations.
Furthermore, since wars are fought for reasons other than
just for collecting combat data, even our knowledge as to what
has occurred in past combat is imperfect and incomplete. One
might even say in technical jargon that military systems in com-
bat are only "partially observable." Finally, since combat models
resemble social-science models more than physical-science ones,
the standards of knowledge about combat should be more like those
of the social sciences than those of the physical sciences. Unfor-
tunately, this has caused difficulties, since the backgrounds of
most military OR workers are most closely related to the latter
field (i.e. the physical sciences). It appears that epistemological
concepts from the social sciences should be quite useful and
possibilities in this direction should be further explored in the
future.
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3.2. Sources, Nature, and Availability of Combat Data
One should distinguish between two types of combat data:
(1) real combat data,
(2) simulated combat data (i.e. data generated in a simu-
lated combat environment by field experiments, field
exercises, war games, machine simulations, etc.).
The two basic primary sources of real combat data are (see McQuie
et al. [13] or McQuie [14] for further details):
(1) archives,
(2) official military histories.
Unfortunately, quantitative data that is needed from these primary
sources for verification of mathematical models of combat is not
readily available: the extraction of such quantitative data from
archives requires great investment in manpower of a highly special-
ized nature (one essentially needs a military historian) , while the
official histories (at least those for the U.S. Army) are purely
narrative and do not contain tables, graphs, or appendices with
data [14]. COL T. N. Dupuy (USA, ret.) of HERO is undoubtedly at
least as knowledgeable as anyone in the world on such data and will
hopefully answer any questions that the author cannot. Moreover,
HERO has provided (from winter 1975 until spring 1978) a "Combat
Data Subscription Service," whose volumes contain quantitative data
2
)
(laboriously) extracted from archives . Finally, secondary sources
2 ) Unfortunately, this valuable service had to be terminated after
two volumes of (quarterly) publication apparently due to lack of
support.
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of real combat data are discussed in many of the papers mentioned
in the Appendix.
After a thorough study of the sources, nature, and avail-
ability of real combat data, McQuie et al. [13] concluded that for
the purposes of statistical analysis, the data available on World
War II and Korea are "inadequate, incomplete, and probably biased."
Incompleteness is a particular problem, with data measured for one
engagement frequently not available for others [13]. Moreover, the
available real combat data is essentially of an aggregated (as
opposed to detailed) nature, i.e. "bean counts" for the larger com-
bat units (see McQuie et al. [13] or McQuie [14] for further details)
In other words, the available historical records do not provide
detailed combat data such as the positions of individual weapons,
targets engaged, engagement conditions for individual target-firer
combinations (including the number of rounds expended at each tar-
get) , etc. Thus, the available real combat data does not support
verification of detailed combat models, but it only supports such
investigations of relatively simple aggregated large-unit models
(see Taylor [15] for a discussion of detailed versus aggregated
combat-attrition models)
.
However, using simulated combat data, one can in principle
verify either detailed small-unit (or even many-on-many) models or
the submodels used in such models. There have apparently been some
efforts along these lines (e.g. by the U.S. Army's Combat Develop-
ments Experimentation Command (CDEC) ) but information dissemination
about them is poor to nonexistent. The author can supply no specific
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references outside of mentioning the recent TETAM (Tactical
2
)
Effectiveness of Antitank Missiles) study by the U.S. Army.
3.3. Verification of Combat Models
There have been some (but surprisingly few) attempts to
verify combat models. To place this work in proper perspective,
it is convenient to conceptually factor the overall combat pro-
cess into the following four components (see Huber, Low, and




(3) C I (command, control, communications, and intelligence)
,
(4) support.
Verification efforts have concentrated on the first of these four
processes, and for present purposes so will we. We may also con-
sider that there are different organizational levels at which com-










3) LTC Richard S. Miller, USA, of the Naval Postgraduate School
can elaborate upon particulars here.
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4)
The available (real) combat data is only on Level 1 of
the above classification scheme, i.e. force-on-force operations,
and then apparently predominantly for large-scale operations.
Generally speaking, one can develop both detailed and also aggre-
gated models of combat processes at each of these five levels
(cf. Taylor [15]). Model verification efforts, moreover, have
apparently considered only the attrition process for such large-
scale force-on-force combat. Furthermore, there are only two
general approaches for verifying such large-scale attrition models
(Al) "replay" some particular historical battle (s) to see
whether or not the model satisfactorily "reproduces"
the historical outcome (s),
and (A2) find regularities or "patterns" in historical battle
data, and then determine whether or not the model
exhibits a similar "pattern."
The first approach has generally involved large-scale
detailed models and large-scale aggregated data (e.g. see Fain
and Wilson [18]). One can raise serious objections about the
4) Simulated combat data of one form or another exists on essentially
all levels, particularly the lower levels (i.e. few-on-few and
below)
.
5) Bonder [17] has considered models of different combat processes
at three different levels: (1) individual firer against a passive
target, (2) small-unit combat (battalion and below), and (3) large-
scale combat. He has discussed the verification of models at these
three system levels. Based on our knowledge of the available com-
bat data, such verification can only pertain to simulated (and not
real) combat data (here some type of field experimentation) , but-
this fact is not explicitly pointed out to the reader. No refer-
ences are given by Bonder [17].
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scientific validity of this approach, although it is beyond the
scope of this paper to further discuss this point. The second
approach has generally involved large-scale aggregated models and
large-scale aggregated data and has by and large considered the
classic constant-coefficient Lanchester-type equations for modern
warfare (e.g. see Taylor [19], [20]), with mixed results being
reported (see the Appendix for further details). To this author,
the general consensus seems to be that such a simple functional
form is not violently contradicted by the available combat data
but that the consequent model predictions are statistically too
inaccurate for practical use [21] (cf. McQuie et al. [13, p. 93]).
A careful review and integration of such past work is lacking and
seems to be in order before plowing new ground.
The Appendix to this paper contains a brief discussion of
most of such empirical verification efforts that are contained in
unclassified sources and are known to this author (see also Boulton
et al. [22]). Most of these investigations have used only (very
aggregated) combat data from secondary sources. There are also
undoubtedly some further investigations that are "buried in"
classified documents (e.g. see Fain and Wilson [18]). Such
investigations should be cataloged and organized for DoD analysts.
4.0. Prospects for Future Work
It appears to this author that it is both feasible and also
highly desirable to improve DoD combat-modelling efforts by
Considering that upwards of $30 million is spent on just the
development of new operational combat models each year (see Shubik
and Brewer [6, p. 12]), it is curious that, little basic research
on any theory of combat, combat-modelling methodologies, or combat
models in general is apparently being undertaken by the U.S. Army
Research Office (ARO) , the Office of Naval Research (ONR) , or the
U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
.
further examining the empirical validity of combat models. There
are a number of rather subtle issues that need articulation (and
possibly even resolution) before such work can be seriously under-
taken, however. For example, the available data base will probably
support the verification of only simple aggregated models of large-
scale combat, whereas the trend is towards the use of more and more
detailed models. The full potentialities of available data sources
should be exploited to extend and refine the real-combat data base.
Along these lines, the work of COL T. N. Depuy (USA, ret.) and HERO
is to be commended. Much more quantitative combat data should be
generated from archival and military-history sources for the combat-
modelling community to use.
A thorough review and integration of past efforts should be
the initial part of any new work, and the conceptual issues raised
by such review of past work should then at least be discussed before
any new analysis is undertaken. In all cases, such work should (1)
be done in a careful, reflective atmosphere, and (2) be given wide
dissemination (e.g. report placed in DDC) to all interested parties.
Coordinated efforts seem to be required for any real progress, with
"critical mass" and "sustained effort" highly desirable (if not
essential)
.
Thus, the author would like to end this paper with the
following conclusions and rhetorical questions:
(1) empirical verification of combat models should be
vigorously pursued;
(2) the data base on real combat should be extended and
refined by further historical research on archives
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from past combat; such work should be closely coor-
dinated with (and possibly directed by) combat-
modelling efforts (including model verification)
;
(3) the entire topic of verification of combat models
needs further discussion and articulation;
(4) it seems appropriate to assess where we have been
(i.e. exactly what previous work has shown) before
striking out in new directions;
(5) important outstanding questions are the following:
(A) How should simulated combat data be used in the
model verification process?
(B) How can the current generation of large-scale
detailed combat models (e.g. see [23]) be
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APPENDIX : Historical Validation of Attrition Models
What confidence do we have that our models can actually pre-
dict what might happen in future possible combat? The simple fact
is that if we are honest, there are some severe limitations on the
current state-of-the-art as far as how literally we should believe
model outputs. The main problem is that the nature and quality of
the available combat data is so extremely poor that we have no
reliable "bench mark" against which to "calibrate" our combat models.
Compared with the physical sciences, there is an almost complete lack
of historical combat data. Although future combat may be quite unlike
that of the past due to the introduction of new technologies and
weaponry, it does seem desirable to (in some sense) calibrate our
models with past operations. Time prohibits the in depth discussion
of this important topic, but we will now briefly review what little
has been done.
A number of studies (see Table I) have considered verifica-
2)tion of very simple Lanchester-type models, i.e. Lanchester *
s
See Helmbold [8] and McQuie [16] for discussions of the limited
availability of historical combat data. Helmbold discusses the
nature of data available from secondary sources (e.g. history
books) , while McQuie discusses the nature of data available from
primary sources (e.g. unit reports and official military histories).
Additionally, McQuie discusses the shortcomings of the historical
combat data that does exist. He provides an outstanding discussion
of the nature, availability, and quality of historical data.
2) We are here using the words "verification" and "validation" inter-
changeably. Many authors distinguish between the verification and
the validation of a model, but there is apparently no consistent
use of these terms in the literature (see, for example, Morris [17],
Bonder [1, pp. 68-70], Van Horn [24], and Naylor and Finger [18]).
For our present purposes, however, such a distinction does not seem
warranted, especially since there is not consistent use of these
terms in the literature.
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TABLE I. Authors Who Have Investigated the Empirical Verifica-
tion of Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare.
J. H. ENGEL (1954)
H. K. WEISS (1957, 1966)
R. L. HELMBOLD 1" (1961a, 1961b, 1964a, 1964b, 1969, 1971a,
1971b)
D. WILLARD (1962)
W. A. SCHMIEMAN (1967)
J. J. BUSSE (1971)
R. W. SAMZ (1972)
J. B. FAIN (1977)
+Here HELMBOLD (1961b) = the second paper published by Helmbold




classic formulations and simple variations thereof. In Table I
we give the authors' names and publication date of every empirical-
verification examination appearing in the open literature and known
to the author. The exact reference to each piece of work may be
obtained by consulting the list of references at the end of this
appendix. All this work has considered secondary sources and com-
bat data, i.e. data available from other sources such as history
books. Usually considering only initial and final strengths in
numbers, it has generated results that at best may be called incon-
clusive. This result is not too surprising, since "aggregated"
forces were considered without any type of "scoring" (i.e. weighting)
of the various different weapon-system types comprising the opposing
heterogeneous forces.
Positive results (i.e. reports of theoretical consequences
not at variance with the available combat data) have been reported
by Engel [3], Weiss [25; 26], Helmbold [5-7; 9-11], Schmieman [21],
Busse [2], and Samz [20]. For example, Weiss [25] reports that
there is some justification for using Lanchester-type equations of
* See Lanchester [15]. More accessibly, these simple differential-
equation combat models are given by, for example, equations (2.1)




modern warfare "as a point of departure" in modelling combat. On
the other hand, after a rather lengthy and comprehensive analysis,
Willard [27, p. 4] concluded that his analysis did not justify the
use of Lanchester ' s classic equations (see Footnote 3 again) for
modelling large-scale combat. This conclusion is not at all sur-
prising, since heterogeneous forces were aggregated on the basis of
numbers alone without any "scoring" of the various different weapon-
system types. Moreover, when such "scoring" is used, much more
positive results have been reported (see Fain [4, pp. 38-39]).
At a conceptual level, Helmbold [10, pp. 1-3] has pointed
out that there are only two general methods for verifying [or test-
5)ing ] combat models:
4) Here (as elsewhere in such verification work) constant attrition-
rate coefficients were assumed. In this case, the equations in
question are given by




and y(0) = y Q ,
where x(t) and y(t) denote the numbers of X and Y combatants,
and a and b are constants that are today called Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficients (see Taylor [22] for further details)
.
'There are, of course, other positions that one can take concerning
the verification of models (see, especially, Naylor and Finger
[18]), In the main text we have presented the two that are most
germane to combat models.
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(Ml) "replay" some historical battle (s) to see whether
or not the model satisfactorily "reproduces" the
historical outcome (s),
and (M2) find regularities or "patterns" in historical battle
data, and then determine whether or not the model
exhibits a similar "pattern."
The usual difficulty with the first method (Ml) is that insuffi-
cient data is available on any one historical battle to carry out
the proposed comparison (see Helmbold [10]; also McQuie [16]).
Even when sufficient data is available, rather restrictive assump-
tions must be made about the conduct of battle, and critical
appraisal of these assumptions leads one to raise serious objections
about generalizations based on such an examination (see Helmbold
[10, pp. 1-2] for further details). The work by Engel [3],
Busse [2], and Samz [20] falls into this first category (Ml),
while that by Weiss [25; 26], Helmbold [5-11], and Schmieman [21]
falls into the second category (M2). This second method (M2) is
nothing more than the Scientific Method of verifying a model in-
directly through checking testable consequences against observa-
tions, the so-called hypothetico-deductive method (see Morris
[17, pp. 101-103]) .
Engel' s work [3] gets more attention from the uninitiated
than it probably should. Its weakness is that he estimated param-
eters and also tested the model with the same set of data and forced
a fit through the initial and final force levels for the battle of
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Iwo Jima. In fact, all such attempts at model verification by
method (Ml), i.e., historical "replay," suffer from such defi-
ciencies (see Helmbold [10, pp. 1-2] for a further discussion).
On the other hand, Helmbold' s work [5-11] has been much more
comprehensive. He has sought to indirectly test Lanchester-type
combat models against the available historical data by empiri-
cally examining the testable consequences of such models 6 * . He
has applied this approach not only to ground battles [5-7] but
Helmbold 's basic idea was to find regularities or "patterns"
in historical battle data and then to determine whether or
not a given simple combat models (Helmbold took Lanchester '
s
equations of modern warfare) exhibits a similar "pattern."
From his historical data, Helmbold found that relative fire
effectiveness a/b (i.e. the ratio of the fire effectiveness
of an individual Y combatant to that of an individual X
combatant) to be strongly correlated with the initial force
ratio x /y~. Helmbold* s data base consisted of initial and
final force levels for both sides for several hundred historical
battles, with one side identified as the attacker (X) and the
other (Y) as the defender. Assuming that the so-called square
law held, Helmbold computed the initial force ratio x Q/y Q ,
survivor fractions x f/x n and y f/y n # advantage paramenter
2 2V = In u where u = {1 - (x
f
/x Q ) }/{l - (y f/y Q ) ), activity
ratio (in our terminology, relative fire effectiveness) a/b,
and the "bitterness" parameter e = /ab t f for each of (all
told for the three investigations [5-7]) several hundred battles
As indicated above, his idea was to collect a sizable body of
data dealing with the historical battles, use this data to com-
pute parameters (advantage, activity ratio, and bitterness)
associated with each battle, and search the results for regu-
larities.
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also to air battles [10] and has reported positive results con-
cerning the validity of Lanchester-type combat models. More
recently, he [11] has examined the validity of "breakpoint-type"
hypotheses and found that "the breakpoint hypothesis yields
theoretical implications that are at variance with the available
battle termination data in several essential respects."
On the other hand, T. N. Dupuy [12-14] has examined combat
data from primary sources and has in some sense shown the validity
of the firepower-score approach. His work apparently is the
original empirical basis for both the ATLAS and also TBM (see
[19]) casualty-rate curves. Subsequently, J. Fain [4] has analyzed
HERO (Historical Evaluation and Research Organization) World War
II data on 60 engagements in four major Italian campaigns and has
reported positive results concerning the scientific validity of
Lanchester-type models of warfare (particularly when a "scoring"
system is used to aggregate the heterogeneous forces). She [4,
p. 34] has emphasized that the HERO data (of which she examined
only a small part) is the most nearly complete and accurate collec-
tion of combat data. Much more work should be done in this area.
It is encouraging that today HERO offers a "combat data subscrip-
tion service" and a journal entitled History, Numbers, and War .
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